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Satisfaction with the NHS has dropped 12% since 2010 and
the government’s rhetoric is largely to blame
Mark Hellowell argues that the government’s own rhetoric during late 2010 and 2011 may
be responsible, at least partly, for the precipitous decline in satisfaction with the NHS.
The biggest ever drop in public satisf action with the National Health Service (NHS) has
been recorded by the Brit ish Social Attitudes. The precipitous f all, f rom 70 per cent in
2010 to 58 per cent in 2011, f ollows a more or less consistent trend of  annual
improvements in satisf action since 2001 (with 2004 being the only exception).
The new data was published by the King’s Fund (which now sponsors the health questions in the BSA)
on 12th June, along with a number of  competing explanations f or the drop in satisf action. It argues that
we cannot take the data as an indication of  weakening perf ormance since the most observable quality
indicators, such as waiting times and rates of  health care acquired inf ections have remained stable.
In addition, as the health minister Simon Burns has been so keen to point out in response to the survey,
there is not yet any evidence of  deterioration in the quality of  care according to the patient experience
surveys undertaken by the NHS.
So what to make of  this sudden reversal of  a 10-year trend? As the King’s Fund’s chief  economist, John
Appleby points out, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the heated debate around the Health and
Social Care Bill must have played a role. If  he is right, the government’s own rhetoric during late 2010 and
2011 may be responsible, at least partly.
Af ter winning of f ice, the coalit ion had a major polit ical management challenge in relation to its health care
policy. Having made a clear manif esto commitment to leave the NHS alone, post-electorally Andrew
Lansley and Co began work on a ref orm programme “so large it could be seen f rom outer space”, in the
words of  the NHS chief  executive Sir David Nicholson.
This incorporated the creation of  a new economic regulator to set prices and promote competit ion
among health care providers, and transf erring commissioning budgets f rom Primary Care Trusts to
groups of  GPs. The ref orms were underpinned by a radical vision of  an NHS that would f inance health
care, to ensure equitable access and avoid the well-understood market f ailures associated with private
f inancing, but would cease to own and manage the means of  health care production.
At the same time, in handing budgets to GPs and providing them with f inancial incentives to manage
demand f or tertiary care, ministers also hoped to transf er responsibility (and thus blame) f or unpopular
rationing decisions away f rom bureaucrats and ministers, down to the most trusted part of  the health
service.
The polit ical management of  this extraordinary U-turn incorporated two principal elements, both of  which
are likely to have had a role on public trust in the NHS:
(1)   To persuade the public that the NHS had a quality shortf all and/or was in crisis.
(2)   To persuade the public that the expansion of  competit ion in the market between health care
providers was the best method of  driving up quality.
In terms of  the f irst element, ministers drew public attention to the poor perf ormance of  the NHS
compared to other OECD countries in terms of  cancer and heart attack survival rates. The of f icial
ministerial brief ing f or the (f irst) Health and Social Care Bill stated that, despite spending the same on
healthcare, the UK’s rate of  death f rom heart disease was double that in France.
This was, it might be noted, a rather cynical presentation of  the f acts. A more judicious assessment
might additionally have noted that the UK had experienced the largest f all in death rates f rom heart
attacks between 1980 and 2006 of  any European country, and trends indicate it will have a lower death
rate than France as soon as this year. Ministers might have added that UK health expenditure is t ill pretty
low by comparative standards – and certainly much lower than France as a percentage of  national
income.
In terms of  the second element – the central importance of  greater competit ion as the route to NHS
salvation – ministers talked up a number of  econometric studies which seemingly show the benef its of
patient choice and competit ion in the market f or hospital services. A number of  these studies (especially
Gaynor et al and Cooper et al) were ref erenced in ministerial brief ings, and were discussed at some
length in documents related to the Bill, such as the equality impact assessment. These studies have
proved highly controversial, although some of  the crit icisms appear to be based on a misunderstanding
of  the econometric methods employed by the authors.
However, the theory underpinning the causal link that both these studies purport to show has also been
crit icised. The claim is that competit ion in the electives market provides incentives f or hospitals to
improve elective surgery and that delivering such improvements requires a general improvement in
hospital management such that across the board enhancement in hospital quality are achieved.
As Gwyn Bevan and Matthew Skellern have pointed out, it is equally plausible that such competit ion f or
elective surgery might, through diversion of  management ef f ort, have negatively af f ected the quality of
other hospital services. In short, the authors argue, the chain of  causation is not adequately understood.
So, while the government’s f ocus on competit ion probably did not constitute evidence-based policy, it
may have helped to create the impression in the public mind that, where services were uncompetit ive,
patients are not getting good care and are dying unnecessarily.
Apart f rom headlines about the poor perf ormance of  the NHS, it is likely that the real- terms f reeze in
NHS f unding and the associated programme to improve productivity has had an ef f ect. From the
coalit ion’s point of  view, it has been important to blame New Labour’s “poisonous NHS legacy” f or the
various uncomf ortable policy decisions that have had to be (and are still to be) made in this budgetary
environment. One manif estation of  this has been the f ocus, by Andrew Lansley, on the role of  the private
f inance init iative (PFI) on the f inances of  NHS Trusts.
Lansley suggested in a brief ing with The Telegraph that the PFI was the leading cause of  f inancial
problems among 22 NHS acute trusts which were “on the brink of  collapse.” The media largely ref lected
the line that the coalit ion government f aced with the task of  cleaning up Labour’s “mess,” and that any
hospital closures or service cuts could be blamed on them.
This was a rather risky element of  polit ical strategy. The account was highly misleading – as was
subsequently pointed out -  not least by many of  the 22 trusts themselves, who argued that their
f inancial problems ran f ar wider than PFI. In addition, as many of  them noted, they did not all have a PFI
deal in operation.
But the misrepresentation helped to maintain the picture of  an NHS as a f iscally unsustainable,
underperf orming health system, weighed down by a poisonous legacy by a prof ligate government, and in
dire need of  market incentives to improve quality.
Following such a barrage of  propaganda, the public’s loss of  f aith in the NHS is at least explicable. Of
course, the collapse poses polit ical problems f or the current government (hence the anti-Lansley brief ing
f rom some Conservative MPs and at t imes lukewarm support f rom Number 10). But to justif y a massive
top-down reorganisation of  the NHS af ter promising to leave the NHS alone, this was probably
inevitable. And, as the Secretary of  State says, he’s not interested in “winning a popularity contest”.
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